When We Cannot Deport, Is It Fair to Detain?: An Analysis of the Rights of Deportable Aliens Under 8 U.S.C 1231(a)(6) and the 1999 INS Interim Procedures Governing Detention by Dinger, Daniel R.
BYU Law Review
Volume 2000 | Issue 4 Article 6
11-1-2000
When We Cannot Deport, Is It Fair to Detain?: An
Analysis of the Rights of Deportable Aliens Under
8 U.S.C 1231(a)(6) and the 1999 INS Interim
Procedures Governing Detention
Daniel R. Dinger
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Immigration Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted
for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniel R. Dinger, When We Cannot Deport, Is It Fair to Detain?: An Analysis of the Rights of Deportable Aliens Under 8 U.S.C 1231(a)(6)
and the 1999 INS Interim Procedures Governing Detention, 2000 BYU L. Rev. 1551 (2000).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2000/iss4/6
6DIN-FIN.DOC 12/9/00 1:39 PM 
 
1551 
When We Cannot Deport, Is It Fair to Detain?: An 
Analysis of the Rights of Deportable Aliens Under 
 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) and the 1999 INS Interim 
Procedures Governing Detention 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As one author wrote, “America has been a nation of immigrants 
from the start.”1 Indeed, for many years in its early history and still 
today, “[t]he United States [has been] a strong magnet for immi-
grants, offering them chances to take up farms in the country or jobs 
in the cities.”2 In fact, between the years of 1820 and 1990, the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) recorded the entry of 
more than one hundred and twelve million immigrants into the 
United States.3 Though many of these aliens welcomed to the 
United States gain citizenship and live productive lives after their ar-
rival, some do not. 
One individual who has not led a productive life since coming to 
the United States is Kestutis Zadvydas. Zadvydas, an immigrant from 
Germany, came to the United States in 1956, at the age of eight, 
and shortly thereafter began building an extensive criminal record.4 
During his first twenty years in the United States, Zadvydas was con-
victed of two serious offenses—attempted robbery and attempted 
burglary—as well as a number of less serious offenses.5 Based on 
these two convictions, the INS initiated deportation proceedings in 
1977, but shortly before he was to appear in front of an immigration 
judge in 1982, Zadvydas disappeared.6 
 
 
 1. 1 GEORGE BROWN TINDALL, AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 278 (3d ed. 
1992). 
 2. Id. at 461. 
 3. See id. at A36–37. 
 4. Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1999). Though Zadvydas 
was given permanent resident status after his arrival, he never became a citizen of the United 
States. See id. 
 5. See id. 
 6. See id. 
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For the next five years, the INS was unable to find him. Then, in 
1987, he was arrested in Virginia for possession of cocaine with in-
tent to distribute but went into hiding again after jumping bail.7 It 
was not until 1992, when Zadvydas voluntarily turned himself over 
to authorities in Texas, then the INS was able to discover his where-
abouts and take him into custody.8 He was tried and convicted on 
the 1987 narcotics distribution charge and was sentenced to sixteen 
years in prison with six years suspended; Zadvydas served two years 
before he was released on parole.9 Shortly after his release, the INS 
took him into custody and reinitiated deportation proceedings. In 
March of 1994, an immigration judge, based on Zadvydas’ history of 
flight, ordered that he be detained without bond during deportation 
proceedings.10 He has been in INS custody since that time and for 
the past six years has been awaiting deportation.11 
In many cases, the deportation of aliens is effected within a short 
period of time—most aliens are deported within just a few months of 
the entry of a final deportation order. However, not all aliens are eas-
ily deported. One such alien is Zadvydas, who, due to circumstances 
clearly beyond his control, is essentially “stateless” and thus has no 
country to which he can be deported.12 Another is Kim Ho Ma, 
“who left his native land, Cambodia, as a refugee at the age of two 
and has resided in the United States as a legal permanent resident 
since he was six.”13 In 1997, as a result of his participation in a gang-
related shooting and a subsequent conviction for manslaughter, the 
INS began deportation proceedings against Ma. However, because 
the United States has no repatriation agreement with Cambodia, Ma 
is also undeportable.14 A number of other countries, such as Laos 
and Vietnam, also have no signed repatriation agreements with the  
 
 
 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See id. 
 11. For more on Kestutis Zadvydas’s story, see Pamela Coyle, Ex-Cons Without Country 
in Limbo, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 6, 1999, at A1. 
 12. For an explanation of the reason that Zadvydas is “stateless,” see Underdown, 185 
F.3d at 291–94. 
 13. Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 14. See id. A repatriation agreement is essentially an agreement that allows each country 
party to the agreement to return to the other country its lawful citizens. 
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United States; so aliens arriving from those countries similarly cannot 
be deported.15 
The problem that arises in situations such as Ma’s and Zadvy-
das’s involves a decision of what to do with these unwanted yet un-
deportable aliens. Because the United States has no repatriation 
agreement with their respective nations, deportation is highly 
unlikely. Yet many of these aliens have extensive criminal records and 
are considered either dangers to the community, high risks of 
flight—meaning it is unlikely that, if ordered deported and then re-
leased, they will voluntarily stay in contact with the INS until depor-
tation is made possible—or both.16 To protect the public from po-
tential recidivism or, in the alternative, to make sure the alien 
ordered deported does not abscond, those aliens ordered deported 
who are found to be dangerous or flight risks are physically detained 
by the INS in local, state, or federal prisons. This detention, how-
ever, is problematic, for what arises in these situations is the possibil-
ity of indefinite detention—criminal aliens potentially being detained 
for life because they cannot be deported and the INS does not want 
to release them into the community. According to some, there are 
over 2,800 such “lifers” now in INS custody.17 
On a legal level, the problem that arises in these situations in-
volves a clash of two important parts of the United States Constitu-
tion.18 On the one hand, Article I of the Constitution gives Congress 
the power to exclude aliens and determine who is welcome within 
the borders of the United States—Congress has the power to “estab-
 
 15. See id. at 818 n.1. 
 16. “[O]ne Justice Department report concluded that 90 percent of aliens released from 
custody abscond.” Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 17. See Mike Clary & Patrick J. McDonnell, Sentenced to a Life in Limbo, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 9, 1998, at A1; see also Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1151 (W.D. Wash. 1999) 
(“More than one hundred habeas corpus petitions are currently pending in the Western Dis-
trict of Washington wherein aliens ordered deported to countries that have refused them ad-
mittance challenge the legality of their continued detention by the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service (INS).”). For more information on the problems facing both the INS and those 
aliens being detained pending deportation, see Dan Malone, INS Faulted in Extended Deten-
tions, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 12, 1999, at 1A. For the story of another alien currently 
awaiting an unlikely deportation in prison, see Mark Bixler, When Jail Becomes Limbo, 
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 9, 2000, at 1D. 
 18. As one court put it, “[s]erious conflicts between policy and constitutional concerns 
are presented by criminal aliens whose countries of origin refuse to repatriate them. Congress’ 
measures to insulate the community from potentially dangerous criminal aliens via lengthy de-
tention have the potential to violate due process. Yet alternatives to incarceration have prob-
lems as well.” Chi Thon Ngo, 192 F.3d at 395. 
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lish an uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . throughout the United 
States.”19 On the other hand, the Fifth Amendment provides a guar-
antee of freedom from detention in that “[n]o person shall be . . . 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process.”20 In prac-
tical terms, the United States Congress has the power to exclude 
unwanted aliens such as Zadvydas. Yet, when such an alien cannot be 
deported—as Zadvydas cannot—questions arise. Does the United 
States have to respect the alien’s presence in the United States and, 
in contravention of Article I, let that person remain in our country? 
Or can the United States, under the power given it by the Constitu-
tion to control its borders, hold an unwanted alien in custody until 
he or she can be deported? Finally, if the United States does have the 
power to detain an alien, but deportation cannot ever be effected, 
can they detain that alien indefinitely without violating the alien’s 
right to due process? These questions have only recently begun to be 
addressed by the federal courts, which, without direct guidance from 
the Supreme Court, have provided a wide-ranging panoply of an-
swers to the above questions. 
This Comment will attempt to address the clash between these 
two parts of the Constitution and the important legal questions that 
a situation such as Zadvydas’s causes to arise. Part II of this Com-
ment addresses the background of immigration law, due process, and 
the Attorney General’s statutory authority to detain aliens. Part III 
analyzes the differing views of the courts that have ruled on the is-
sues presented above. Part IV analyzes the arguments set forth by 
the various courts and proposes that, in cases of potential indefinite 
detention, courts should permit long-term detention of unwanted 
criminal aliens when releasing them would be disadvantageous to the 
community, even if that detention becomes indefinite. Finally, this 
Comment concludes with Part V, a concise summary of the policies, 
issues, and answers presented herein. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Under Article I of the United States Constitution, Congress has 
the power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . 
 
 19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 20. U.S. CONST. amend. V. As courts have made clear, the Fifth Amendment refers to 
the protection of “persons” and not just “citizens.” 
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throughout the United States.”21 This provision has generally been 
interpreted to mean that Congress can determine which immigrants 
and aliens should be permitted to enter and remain in the United 
States.22 The Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person shall 
be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process,”23 
which, in one respect, dictates that deprivations of physical liberty 
should only be permitted when the government has a compelling 
and narrowly tailored interest that supports it. To understand the 
way in which these provisions clash in alien-detention situations, a 
general understanding of immigration law and due process is re-
quired. 
A. Immigration Law 
Much has been written about the law of immigration, a subject 
so vast that volumes have been dedicated to its study. This Comment 
addresses only one sphere of immigration law—that of the detention 
of unwanted deportable aliens. However, in order to understand the 
issues presented and analyzed in this Comment, as well as the argu-
ments and decisions in the cases discussed herein, one must be famil-
iar with the basics of Congress’s plenary power in the immigration 
law arena, its right to determine which aliens will be allowed to enter 
and remain in the United States, and the difference between exclud-
able and deportable aliens. 
1. Congress’s plenary power in immigration law 
Congress has a very significant, almost unchecked, power over 
immigration—a power often referred to as its plenary power. In ad-
dressing Congress’s power to “establish an uniform Rule of Natu-
ralization,” the United States Supreme Court has held that “[t]he 
exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty . . . inherent in 
the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation.”24 
The power to exclude aliens “is identical regardless of whether the 
government seeks to exclude an alien who has not entered [the 
 
 21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 22. See generally infra Parts II.A.1 and II.A.2. See also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 
(1977). 
 23. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 24. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); see also The 
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
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country], or to expel an alien who has resided” within the borders of 
the United States for an extended period of time.25 Additionally, 
“courts have long recognized that the governmental power to ex-
clude or expel aliens may restrict aliens’ constitutional rights when 
the two come into direct conflict.”26 
Generally vested only in the legislative and executive branches, 
this power “to expel or exclude aliens [is also] . . . largely immune 
from judicial control.”27 As such, “[t]he power of the national gov-
ernment to act in the immigration sphere is thus essentially ple-
nary.”28 In fact, the Supreme Court has even stated that “over no 
conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more com-
plete.”29 
2. The right to accept or exclude aliens 
The plenary power gives Congress the right to determine which 
foreign-born persons are welcome within the borders of the United 
States, as well as the right to determine which foreign-born individu-
als are not welcome. With respect to allowing persons born outside 
of the country to become citizens of the United States, Congress has  
 
 
 25. Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 288 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Fong Yue 
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (“The right of a nation to expel or deport 
foreigners, who have not been naturalized . . . is as absolute and unqualified, as the right to 
prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country.”). 
 26. Underdown, 185 F.3d at 289; see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976) 
(“In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly 
makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 
U.S. 753 (1972); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904). 
 27. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex 
rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953)). Judicial deference to the political branches of the govern-
ment on immigration matters serves a number of purposes. For example, judicial deference 
“allows for greater flexibility to adjust policy choices to changing political and economic cir-
cumstances” and further “allows the political branches to ‘exercise especially sensitive political 
functions that implicate questions of foreign relations.’” Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 
1155 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (quoting INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (cita-
tions omitted)). 
 28. Underdown, 185 F.3d at 289; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305–06 
(1993). 
 29. Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 
U.S. 320, 339 (1909)). Though the legislature has great power over the area of immigration, 
the plenary power is subject to limitation in that it must be exercised in a manner that furthers 
a legitimate governmental purpose. 
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adopted a series of rules for a process termed naturalization.30 On 
this subject, the Supreme Court wrote that Congress has the power 
“to prescribe the terms and conditions on which [aliens] come in,”31 
and it is only after full compliance with the terms set by Congress 
does the privilege of gaining citizenship become a right.32 
With respect to determining which aliens should not be allowed 
to enter the United States or remain once they have entered, Con-
gress has a number of options. First, a naturalized citizen is not nec-
essarily guaranteed citizenship for life. In some circumstances, a 
naturalized citizen is subject to having his or her citizenship re-
voked.33 Second, in addition to its power to denaturalize naturalized 
aliens, Congress has the absolute power to exclude unwanted aliens 
before naturalization occurs, regardless of how long a particular alien 
may have resided in the United States. Regarding this power, the 
Supreme Court wrote: 
That the government of the United States, through the action of 
the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a 
proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdic-
tion over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every in-
dependent nation. It is a part of its independence. If it could not 
exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject to the control of 
another power. . . . “The United States, in their relation to foreign 
countries and their subjects or citizens are one nation, invested 
with powers which belong to independent nations, the exercise of 
which can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute inde-
pendence and security throughout its entire territory.”34 
 
 30. The Supreme Court has defined naturalization as “the act of adopting a foreigner, 
and clothing him with the privileges of a native citizen.” Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 
U.S. 135, 162 (1892). Gaining citizenship through naturalization is a privilege, and as such 
Congress has a right to set the terms that a person must meet to acquire that privilege. One 
such term requires that applicants for citizenship be of “good moral character.” 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1427(a)(3) (1994). Convicted felons are statutorily deemed to not be of good moral charac-
ter. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(4) and (5) (1994). 
 31. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 335 (1909); see also The 
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 603–04 (1889). 
 32. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 615 (1931). 
 33. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481–1489 (1994); see also Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 
(1961); Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946); Johannessen v. United States, 225 
U.S. 227 (1912). 
 34. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 603–04 (1889) (quoting Cohens v. Vir-
ginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 264, 413 (1821)); see also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 
(1972); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 
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The history of American law is replete with legislation regulating 
and restricting immigration into the United States.35 The first act of 
Congress aimed at excluding unwanted aliens from the United States 
was the Alien Act of 1798, which sanctioned the exclusion of any 
alien that the President deemed dangerous.36 Almost a century later, 
in 1875, Congress enacted legislation which barred convicts and 
prostitutes from immigrating to and residing in the United States.37 
Other grounds for exclusion were codified shortly thereafter.38 Some 
of these additional exclusion-permitting laws included the Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882,39 and quota-based immigration legislation.40 
Today, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (“INA”), 
with certain revisions made throughout the years, governs the 
deportability of aliens.41 The INA contains a list of classes of aliens 
that can be removed from the United States.42 Though Congress has 
set forth the basis for exclusion or deportation in the INA—a right 
guaranteed it by the Constitution—the courts, subject to the defer-
ence granted by the plenary power, remain free to interpret that stat-
ute and review its administration by governmental entities.43 
3. Excludable aliens versus deportable aliens 
Immigration law differentiates between at least two different 
types of aliens in the deportation or removal context. The first, gen-
erally termed excludable or inadmissible aliens, are those aliens ineli-
 
(1913); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904); The Japanese Immi-
grant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893). 
 35. See generally THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS 
AND INTERPRETATION (Johnny H. Killian & George A. Costello eds., 1996). 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See id. These exclusions included: “idiots, lunatics, convicts, and persons likely to 
become public charges” (1882); “cheap foreign labor” (1885); “persons suffering from certain 
diseases, those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude, paupers, and polygamists” 
(1891); “epileptics, insane persons, professional beggars, and anarchists” (1903); “feeble-
minded, children unaccompanied by parents, persons suffering with tuberculosis, and women 
coming to the United States for prostitution or other immoral purposes” (1907). Id. at 277 
n.1202. 
 39. See id. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1525 (1994). 
 42. See id. at § 1182. 
 43. See INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214 (1966). 
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gible for admission into the United States.44 The second type, gener-
ally referred to as deportable aliens, are those who have gained ad-
mission to the United States as resident aliens but have not, at the 
time of deportation, qualified for naturalization.45 Though this 
Comment addresses the indefinite detention of deportable aliens, 
understanding the nature of excludable aliens and their rights is im-
portant: many of the courts’ rulings on the issue of the detention of 
deportable aliens followed an examination of cases dealing with the 
indefinite detention of excludable aliens.46 
B. The Right to Due Process of Law 
To understand the controversy that arises in cases involving the 
continued detention of deportable aliens, one must also understand 
 
 44. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (defining which aliens are deemed excludable). Though these 
aliens are considered ineligible for admission into the United States, many of them are never-
theless allowed to remain in the United States pending deportation to their countries of origin. 
Though these aliens “may physically be allowed within [the] borders [of the United States] 
pending a determination of admissibility, [they] are legally considered to be detained at the 
border and hence as never having effected entry into this country.” Gisbert v. United States 
Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1440 (5th Cir. 1993). This situation is commonly referred to 
as the “entry fiction.” Id.; see also Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 
1995) (en banc). 
  The Supreme Court summarized the history of the entry fiction in Shaughnessy v. 
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). The Court wrote: 
Aliens seeking entry from contiguous lands obviously can be turned back at the bor-
der without more. While the Government might keep entrants by sea aboard the 
vessel pending determination of their admissibility, resulting hardships to the alien 
and inconvenience to the carrier persuaded Congress to adopt a more generous 
course. By statute it authorized . . . aliens’ temporary removal from ship to shore. 
But such temporary harborage, an act of legislative grace, bestows no additional 
rights. Congress meticulously specified that such shelter ashore “shall not be consid-
ered a landing” nor relieve the vessel of the duty to transport back the alien if ulti-
mately excluded. And this Court has long considered such temporary arrangements 
as not affecting an alien’s status; he is treated as if stopped at the border. 
Id. at 215 (citations omitted). 
 45. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (defining which aliens are deemed deportable). 
 46. With respect to excludable aliens, the general consensus of the courts is that these 
aliens can, without a violation of their constitutional rights, be detained indefinitely pending 
deportation. See Shaughnessy, 345 U.S. at 215 (1953) (“[W]e do not think that respondent’s 
exclusion deprives him of any statutory or constitutional right.”); Gisbert, 988 F.2d at 1442 
(“We hold that the continued INS detention of prisoners is not punishment and does not con-
stitute a violation of the aliens’ rights to substantive due process.”); see also Chi Thon Ngo v. 
INS, 192 F.3d 390 (3d Cir. 1999); Guzman v. Tippy, 130 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 1997); Barrera-
Echavarria, 44 F.3d at 1441. But see Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th 
Cir. 1981). 
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the guarantee of due process of law set forth in the Constitution, as 
it relates to both United States citizens and foreign-born aliens. 
1. Due process—generally  
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution pro-
hibit the deprivation of “life, liberty, or property, without due proc-
ess of law.”47 Due process analysis has two parts or components: sub-
stantive due process and procedural due process.48 
a. Substantive due process. In general, “[s]ubstantive due process 
prevents the Government from interfering with rights implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty or engaging in conduct that ‘shocks the 
conscience.’”49 Further, substantive due process “forbids the gov-
ernment to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all, no 
matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”50 One such fundamen-
tal liberty interest is that of being free from physical detention.51 
“When substantive due process rights are properly invoked, they 
guard against certain government intrusions into the private sphere 
regardless of the fairness of the process employed by the govern-
ment.”52 
b. Procedural due process. The second component of due process, 
termed procedural due process, “ensures that government action de-
priving a person of life, liberty or property is implemented in a fair 
manner.”53 As one would expect, “[t]he constitutional sufficiency of 
procedures provided in any situation . . . varies with the circum-
 
 47. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 48. “Substantive and procedural due process claims must be supported by an underlying 
liberty interest. A liberty interest can arise in one of two ways: (1) from the Due Process Clause 
itself; or (2) from a state or federal statute.” Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1058 (10th Cir. 
2000) (citations omitted). Any analysis of due process claims must necessarily start with a 
“careful description of the asserted right.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). 
 49. Cholak v. United States, No. 98–365, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7424, at *17 (E.D. 
La. May 18, 1998) (citation omitted); see also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–25 
(1937). 
 50. Flores, 507 U.S. at 301–02 (emphasis in original). 
 51. See Ho, 204 F.3d at 1062 (“Liberty is one of those basic rights enjoyed by all ‘per-
sons,’ as ‘[f]reedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected 
by the Due Process Clause.’” (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)) (dissent-
ing opinion). 
 52. Hermanowski v. Farquharson, 39 F. Supp. 2d 148, 157 (D.R.I. 1999). 
 53. Cholak, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7424, at *17–18. 
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stances.”54 In determining whether a particular procedure affords an 
individual procedural due process, 
[a] Court must review the existing procedural framework, then 
consider “the interest at stake for the individual, the risk of an er-
roneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used as 
well as the probable value of additional or different procedural 
safeguards, and the interest of the government in using the current 
procedures.”55 
When the procedures implemented by government to restrict a per-
son’s liberty are unfair, a court will strike those procedures down as a 
violation of the right to procedural due process. With respect to re-
strictions on physical liberty, whenever any person is to be detained 
for any reason, both elements of due process must be met. Other-
wise, the detention is unconstitutional.56 
2. Due process—aliens 
Aliens can claim some constitutional protections. Under Su-
preme Court jurisprudence, all persons within the territory of the 
United States are entitled to due process of law, including aliens.57 
Indeed, “[a]liens, both legal and illegal, are entitled to due proc-
ess.”58 An alien’s right to due process of law is the most significant 
check on the executive branch’s plenary power over aliens.59 But 
while aliens are entitled to the protections of the Due Process 
Clause, it is clear that they do “not enjoy the full panoply of rights 
enjoyed by United States citizens.”60 Indeed, “Congress regularly 
makes rules [for non-citizen aliens] that would be unacceptable if 
 
 54. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (citing Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv., 
452 U.S. 18, 24–25 (1981)). 
 55. Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1156 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (quoting Plasencia, 
459 U.S. at 34 (1982)). 
 56. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 57. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896); see also United States v. 
Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 671 (1998); Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32–33; Kwong Hai Chew v. Cold-
ing, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953). 
 58. Cholak, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7424, at *18 (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 
77 (1976); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982)). 
 59. See Hermanowski v. Farquharson, 39 F. Supp. 2d 148, 156 (D.R.I. 1999) (“[T]he 
power of executive branch officers to detain aliens pending deportation pursuant to a statutory 
grant of authority is not without limits. This power, like most powers of government, is subject 
to the counter-weight of due process.”). 
 60. Id. 
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applied to citizens.”61 The issue that courts must face, and on which 
they often differ in the deportation context, is the specific nature of 
the rights belonging to excludable, resident, and deportable aliens 
respectively. 
a. Rights of excludable aliens. Under the “entry fiction,”62 exclud-
able aliens “are legally considered to be detained at the border and 
are thus not entitled to due process protection.”63 As such, “the Due 
Process Clause affords an excludable alien no procedural protection 
beyond the procedure explicitly authorized by Congress, nor any 
‘substantive right to be free from immigration detention.’”64 Indeed, 
the long-term detention of excludable aliens pending deportation is 
generally considered allowable.65 
b. Rights of resident aliens. Resident aliens, or those who have 
been admitted to the United States, have significantly more rights 
than excludable aliens; for “[o]nce an alien gains admission to our 
country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent resi-
dence, his constitutional status changes accordingly.”66 This means 
that resident aliens are, unlike excludable aliens, entitled to the due 
process protections guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment,67 though 
not to the extent enjoyed by full citizens of the United States. 
c. Rights of deportable aliens. As the above discussion shows, it is 
well-established that while excludable aliens have some constitutional 
rights, those rights are fewer in number and lesser in degree than any 
belonging to citizens of the United States. It is also generally ac-
cepted that resident aliens have more significant rights than exclud-
able aliens, such that they are given protections of substantive and 
procedural due process that excludable aliens are not given.68 The is-
 
 61. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 80; see also Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (hold-
ing that a state can exclude resident aliens from basic government functions without violating 
the Constitution). 
 62. See supra note 44. 
 63. Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1153 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (citing Landon v. 
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32–33 (1982); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 
206 (1953); Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc)). 
 64. Phan, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1154 (quoting Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 
(1982)) (alteration in original). 
 65. See Gisbert v. United States Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1448 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 66. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32. 
 67. See Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1061 (10th Cir. 2000) (dissenting opinion). 
 68. See Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32–33; Gisbert, 988 F.2d at 1442 n.8. The Supreme 
Court has, in a number of cases, addressed the procedural due process rights guaranteed to 
deportable aliens during the process of determining whether or not deportation is in order. See 
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sue that arises—an issue on which the courts disagree—is the extent 
of rights belonging to deportable aliens, or aliens who were once 
resident aliens but have since been slated for deportation. Some 
courts have held that these aliens retain all of the rights that they en-
joyed as resident aliens until they are physically removed from the 
country, while others feel that once an order of deportation is final-
ized, the rights that these aliens enjoyed as residents disappear.69 
Again, this Comment will address this issue and the views of the re-
spective courts that have addressed it. 
C. Government Interest in Detention of Certain Persons 
Also important for the purposes of this Comment are (1) the law 
of the United States regarding detention; (2) the government’s in-
terest in the detention of certain persons; and (3) the way in which 
due process interacts with detention. 
1. Government interest in detaining certain persons 
As one court wrote, “[d]etention is a deprivation of liberty.”70 
Indeed, “freedom from physical restraint ‘has always been at the core 
of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary 
government action.’”71 “In our society liberty is the norm, and de-
tention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited excep-
tion.”72 This interest in freedom from restraint is not, however, sac-
rosanct and untouchable. The government can, so long as certain 
requirements are met, detain individuals for the good of the nation, 
even when no crime has been committed.73 For example, the gov-
 
Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 32–33; Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 153–54 (1945); The Japanese 
Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903). These cases do not, however, address the na-
ture of an alien’s procedural due process rights following the actual entry of an order of depor-
tation. 
 69. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 70. Nguyen v. Fasano, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1110 (S.D. Cal. 2000). 
 71. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 
U.S. 71, 80 (1992)). 
 72. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). 
 73. See Hermanowski v. Farquharson, 39 F. Supp. 2d 148, 157 (D.R.I. 1999). Specifi-
cally, the government can only detain a person when that detention serves to meet a narrowly 
tailored and compelling government interest. Additionally, the detention must not exceed the 
scope of that narrowly tailored interest. See Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1154–55 
(W.D. Wash. 1999) (“[A] deprivation will comport with due process only if it is narrowly tai-
lored to serve a compelling government interest. . . . This requires the Court . . . to ask 
6DIN-FIN.DOC 12/9/00  1:39 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
1564 
ernment has a regulatory interest in community safety and may, in 
certain circumstances, “detain individuals whom the Government be-
lieves to be dangerous.”74 Further, when the government has an in-
terest in securing an individual’s presence at a particular time and 
place, detention may be appropriate when the person is unlikely to 
appear as requested.75 In sum, whether detention is a violation of a 
detainee’s constitutional rights depends, in large part, on the pur-
pose of that detention.76 
Courts have a duty to protect against unwarranted and unconsti-
tutional detention. The Southern District of California described the 
process courts use in making these determinations in Nguyen v. 
Fasano:77 
In detention cases, to determine whether a deprivation of liberty is 
impermissible punishment or permissible regulation, the court must 
examine whether the deprivation of liberty is imposed for the pur-
pose of punishment or in furtherance of regulatory goals; and if in 
furtherance of regulatory goals, whether the deprivation is excessive 
in relation to the purpose for the deprivation.78 
In the case of the detention of unwanted deportable aliens, courts 
must decide if the detention “is excessive in relation to the  
 
whether the detention is based upon ‘permissible’ regulatory goals of the government and, if it 
is, whether the detention is excessive in relation to those goals.”) (citations omitted). See also 
Vo v. Greene, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1284 (D. Co. 1999) (“When determining whether deten-
tion serves a compelling government interest, [one] should first decide ‘whether the detention 
is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is merely incidental to another legiti-
mate governmental purpose.’” (quoting Gilbert v. United States Attorney General, 988 F.2d 
1437, 1441 (5th Cir. 1993)).  
 74. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748. With respect to particular situations in which a person 
deemed to be dangerous was permitted to be detained, see Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 
(1948). See also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 281 (1984) (permitting pre-trial detention of 
juvenile delinquents considered to be dangerous); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537–42 
(1952) (permitting the detention of potentially dangerous aliens pending deportation). 
 75. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (1994) (“[I]f, after a hearing . . . the judicial officer finds 
that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the 
person as required . . . he shall order the detention of the person prior to trial.”). See also Bell 
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–40 (1979) (permitting the detention of an accused pending 
trial where the accused presented a risk of flight). 
 76. Phan, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1154–55 (“[T]he Court [is required] to consider the con-
stitutionality of the detention in light of its purpose . . . .”); see also Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 
(“To determine whether a restriction on liberty constitutes impermissible punishment or per-
missible regulation, we must first look to legislative intent.”); Schall, 467 U.S. at 269. 
 77. 84 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (S.D. Cal. 2000). 
 78. Id. at 1110. 
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purpose for the deprivation.”79 “Such a determination is highly de-
pendent on the unique facts of each case.”80 
2. Detention and due process 
While the government does have an interest in detaining certain 
persons, that detention can, at some point, become a violation of 
due process, though it was not such a violation to begin with.81 As 
one court wrote, “If a substantive due process violation is to be 
found in the practice of detention . . . it can only be based upon a 
finding that the detention under a particular set of factual circum-
stances is excessive in relation to the governmental purposes behind 
the restriction in [a] particular context.”82 
D. The Detention of Unwanted Aliens 
It is a longstanding rule that “[t]he government’s interest in effi-
cient administration of the immigration laws at the border . . . is 
weighty.”83 As such, Congress has given the INS power to detain 
aliens pending deportation. 
1. The purpose of detaining aliens—generally  
The purpose of detaining aliens is three-fold. First and foremost, 
detention advances the government’s interest in “ensuring the re-
 
 79. Id.; see also Schall, 467 U.S. at 269. In Phan v. Reno, the Western District of Wash-
ington expounded on this procedure, arguing that strict scrutiny review was required in these 
cases. The court wrote: 
As a general rule, government invasions of fundamental liberty interests are subject 
to strict scrutiny review: a deprivation will comport with due process only if it is nar-
rowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. Applying this standard of 
review in detention cases, courts consider whether the detention is “imposed for the 
purpose of punishment or whether it is merely incidental to another legitimate gov-
ernmental interest.” This requires the Court to consider the constitutionality of the 
detention in light of its purpose, and to ask whether the detention is based upon 
“permissible” regulatory goals of the government and, if it is, whether the detention 
is excessive in relation to those goals. 
Phan, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1154–55 (quoting Gilbert v. United States Attorney General, 988 
F.2d 1437, 1441 (5th Cir. 1993); see also In re Indefinite Detention Cases, 82 F. Supp. 2d 
1098, 1100 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 
 80. Hermanowski v. Farquharson, 39 F. Supp. 2d 148, 159 (D.R.I. 1999). 
 81. See id. at 158–59. 
 82. Id. at 159. 
 83. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982). 
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moval of aliens ordered deported.”84 Second, “detention helps to 
guarantee reliable and speedy deportation by preventing the alien 
from absconding during the pendency of the deportation proceed-
ings.”85 Third, with respect to aliens such as Zadvydas, the “deten-
tion of an alien who has been convicted of an aggravated felony fur-
thers the government’s efforts to protect the community from 
criminal behavior.”86 All three of these interests are legitimate and 
satisfy the permissibility standard set forth by the Supreme Court in 
United States v. Salerno,87 meaning they provide the government 
with the legitimate interest necessary to impose detention on certain 
persons. 
2. Due process and the detention of aliens 
Courts have agreed on the proposition that immigration deten-
tion is not punishment but “is merely an administrative incident to 
the civil deportation process;”88 therefore, it does not violate due 
process guarantees under the Constitution.89 That detention can, 
however, become a violation if it ever goes beyond the interest that 
the government has in detaining the alien. 
With respect to the detention of aliens, “consideration of several 
factors [has] been identified by federal courts as relevant to . . . an 
examination”90 of whether due process has been violated in this 
 
 84. Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1155 (W.D. Wash. 1999). 
 85. Hermanowski, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 159 (citation omitted). 
 86. Id. 
 87. See Phan, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1156. With respect to these regulatory goals, the Phan 
Court wrote: 
Clearly the government has a legitimate interest in securing the safe removal of 
aliens. Indeed, this is a primary objective of the INS: to decide which aliens may re-
main in the United States and which must leave, and to facilitate the safe and expe-
ditious removal of aliens ordered deported. The latter two goals are incidental to 
this primary objective. 
Id. 
 88. Hermanowski, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 158; see also Alvarez-Mendez v. Stock, 941 F.2d 
956, 962 (9th Cir. 1991); Tran v. Caplinger, 847 F. Supp. 469, 475 (W.D. La. 1993) (“Con-
gress did not provide for detention of aliens convicted of aggravated felonies as a means of 
punishment.”). 
 89. Immigration detention imposed for the purpose of punishment beyond that meted 
out by the criminal courts is, without a doubt, a violation of due process. Hermanowski, 39 F. 
Supp. 2d at 158. 
 90. Id. at 159. 
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manner. These factors include the length of detention,91 the likeli-
hood of deportation,92 the potential length of future detention, the 
likelihood that release will serve to frustrate the actual deportation of 
the alien, and the danger the specific alien poses to the community if 
released.93 As one court addressing this subject wrote, in making a 
due process determination, “we must necessarily balance the likeli-
hood that the government will be able to effectuate deportation, 
against the dangerousness of a petitioner and the likelihood that he 
will abscond if released.”94 
3. Detention of excludable aliens 
Though the issue in cases such as Ma’s involves the potentially 
indefinite detention of deportable aliens, courts have in the past ad-
dressed the issue of the prolonged detention of excludable aliens.95 
Though the issue is different, understanding the case law regarding 
the indefinite detention of excludable aliens is important because, in 
making their decisions on detention of deportable aliens, courts have 
looked to these earlier cases for guidance. 
The seminal case in the area of the potentially indefinite deten-
tion of excludable aliens is Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. 
Mezei,96 a 1953 Supreme Court decision which dealt with the deten-
tion of “an alien immigrant permanently excluded from the United 
States on security grounds but stranded in [a] temporary haven on 
Ellis Island because other countries will not take him back.”97 In 
Mezei, the alien in question was seeking a return to the United States 
after having spent nineteen months behind the Iron Curtain.98 The 
Korean War was in progress, and the United States was distrusting of 
communism and communist-controlled nations. Mezei was seen as a 
 
 91. See Truong Thanh Tam v. INS, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1191–92 (E.D. Cal. 1998); 
United States v. Zadvydas, 986 F. Supp. 1011, 1026–27 (E.D. La. 1997). 
 92. See Trunng ThanhTam, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 1191–92; Zadvydas, 986 F. Supp. at 
1026–27; Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 793 (D. Kan. 1980). 
 93. See Hermanowski, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 159 (D.R.I. 1999). 
 94. Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1156 (W.D. Wash. 1999). 
 95. In review, deportable aliens are those who were at one time admitted into the 
United States as permanent residents, but have since been ordered deported. Excludable aliens, 
in contrast, are those aliens who the United States rejected at the border and deemed unwor-
thy of permanent resident status. 
 96. 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
 97. Id. at 207. 
 98. See id. at 208. 
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security risk; 99 therefore, the Supreme Court held that the continued 
exclusion and detention of Mezei did not “deprive[] him of any 
statutory or constitutional right.”100 
Though Mezei has, by some courts, been distinguished on its 
facts—it admittedly dealt with a unique situation—a number of more 
recent cases have firmly entrenched in federal case law the rule set 
forth in Mezei. For example, in Gisbert v. United States Attorney Gen-
eral,101 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that “the continued 
INS detention of [excludable aliens] is not punishment and does not 
constitute a violation of the aliens’ rights to substantive due proc-
ess.”102 Similarly, in Guzman v. Tippy,103 the Second Circuit stated 
that the “[i]ndefinite detention of excludable aliens does not violate 
due process.”104 And finally, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in 
its ruling in Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison,105 stated that “[b]ecause 
excludable aliens are deemed under the entry doctrine not to be pre-
sent on United States territory, a holding that they have no substan-
tive right to be free from immigration detention reasonably fol-
lows.”106 
Again, though this Comment addresses the detention of deport-
able aliens and not excludable aliens, understanding the rule of Mezei 
and its progeny is important because many courts have looked to 
that rule to determine whether deportable aliens can be similarly de-
tained without a violation of the Due Process Clause. 
4. Detention of deportable aliens 
Under the current system, the detention of deportable aliens is 
permitted by statutory law. Prior to 1996, the former 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1252 permitted the detention. The current law allowing detention 
is found in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), which is supplemented by various 
subsections of 8 C.F.R. § 241. 
 
 99. As one court distinguishing Mezei pointed out, “security risks and enemy aliens dur-
ing wartime have always been treated specially.” Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 
1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1981). 
 100. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 215. 
 101. 988 F.2d 1437 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 102. Id. at 1442. 
 103. 130 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 104. Id. at 66. 
 105. 44 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 106. Id. at 1450. 
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a. 8 U.S.C. § 1252: The prior law. Prior to 1996, aliens ordered 
deported generally could not be detained pending that deportation 
for a period of more than six months.107 “Upon expiration of the six-
month period, such aliens had to be released, but they remained sub-
ject to the supervision of the Attorney General.”108 
b. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a): The current law. In 1996, Congress al-
tered the detention provisions of the INA when it enacted the Anti-
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) and 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996 (“IIRIRA”). The AEDPA amended 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) “to 
require the Attorney General to take into custody aliens convicted of 
aggravated felonies, controlled substance offenses, firearms offenses, 
and other serious crimes upon the release of such aliens from incar-
ceration.”109 The AEDPA also “required the Attorney General to de-
tain such aliens pending their removal from the United States.”110 
Section 1231 of Title 8 of the United States Code, enacted as a 
part of the IIRIRA, deals with the post-1996 detention and removal 
of aliens ordered removed by an immigration judge. Of specific im-
portance to this Comment is subsection (a). Section 1231(a)(1) de-
fines what is termed the “removal period.” Specifically, this section 
requires that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, when an 
alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the 
alien from the United States within a period of 90 days.”111 Section 
1231(a)(2) requires the Attorney General to detain all aliens during 
that ninety-day period.112 Subsections (a)(3) and (a)(4) address the 
supervision of aliens released within the United States after the 
 
 107. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (1994). 
 108. Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1151–52 (W.D. Wash. 1999). See former 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(d) (1994). 
 109. Phan, 56 F. Supp. 2d at 1152. 
 110. Id. 
 111. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1). 
 112. “During the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(a)(2). With respect to § 1231(a)(1) and (2), the Underdown court interpreted the law 
as follows: 
Under . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1) & (2), the Attorney General is required to re-
move an alien from the United States within the “removal period,” defined gener-
ally as the ninety days beginning when an order of removal becomes administratively 
final, when any judicial review thereof is completed, or when the alien is released 
from confinement (other than under an immigration process), whichever is latest, 
and is required to detain the alien during the removal period. 
185 F.3d 279, 287 (5th Cir. 1999). 
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ninety-day removal period and the removal of aliens imprisoned, ar-
rested, or on parole, supervised release, or probation at the time re-
moval is ordered, respectively. And subsection (a)(5) addresses the 
reinstatement of removal orders against aliens who have illegally re-
entered the country. 
For the purposes of this Comment, the most important and dis-
puted portion of § 1231 is subsection (a)(6): 
An alien ordered removed who is . . . removable under section 
1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(4) . . . or who has been de-
termined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or 
unlikely to comply with the order of removal, may be detained be-
yond the removal period and, if released, shall be subject to the 
terms of supervision in paragraph (3).113 
Clearly the language of § 1231(a)(6) explicitly permits detention be-
yond the ninety-day removal period for certain categories of aliens.114 
The question that the courts have had difficulty and dissension ad-
dressing involves the permissible length of that post–removal period 
detention and whether potentially indefinite detention under it 
would constitute a violation of due process. 
c. 8 C.F.R.. §§ 241.1–241.4. Part 241 of Title 8, Chapter I, of the 
Code of Federal Regulations, which supplements 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1231(a), addresses, among other things, the post-hearing deten-
tion and removal of aliens under the 1996 Act. Sections 241.1 
through 241.4 are important with respect to the issues addressed in 
this Comment. 
 
 
 113. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). 
 114. The Ma court described the categories of aliens that can and cannot be removed. It 
wrote: 
Under the statute, aliens who cannot be removed at the end of ninety days fall into 
two groups. Those in the first group must be released subject to supervisory regula-
tions that require them, among other things, to appear regularly before an immigra-
tion officer, provide information to that official, notify INS of any change in their 
employment or residence within 48 hours, submit to medical and psychiatric testing, 
and comply with substantial restrictions on their travel. Those in the second group 
“may be detained beyond the removal period” and, if released, shall be subject to the 
same supervisory provisions applicable to aliens in the first group. Aliens in the sec-
ond group include, among others, persons removable because of criminal convic-
tions (such as drug offenses, certain crimes of moral turpitude, “aggravated felo-
nies,” firearms offenses, and various other crimes). 
Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 821 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227, 1231). 
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Section 241.1 deals with final orders of removal and sets forth six 
scenarios in which an order of removal made by an immigration 
judge “at the conclusion of proceedings under section 240 of the 
Act shall become final.”115 Section 241.2 addresses the procedures 
for the issuance and execution of a warrant of removal. Section 
241.3 addresses the issue of detention of aliens ordered deported 
during the removal period. It states, in pertinent part, “[o]nce the 
removal period defined in section 241(a)(1) of the Act begins, an 
alien in the United States will be taken into custody pursuant to the 
warrant of removal.”116 
Most important for the purpose of this Comment, § 241.4 ad-
dresses the continued detention of aliens beyond the removal period 
ordered deportation. This section provides: 
(a) Continuation of custody for . . . criminal aliens. The district di-
rector may continue in custody any alien . . . removable under sec-
tion 237(a)(1)(c), 237 (a)(2), or 237 (a)(4) of the Act, or who pre-
sents a significant risk of noncompliance with the order of removal, 
beyond the removal period, as necessary, until removal from the 
United States.117 
Section 241 also provides a way for aliens who fit in any of the 
above categories to acquire release when the ninety-day removal pe-
riod expires. The burden of proving appropriate release is placed 
upon the alien and not the government as it would be in a pre-trial 
detention setting. In this respect, § 241.4 provides: 
If such an alien demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that 
the release would not pose a danger to the community or a signifi-
cant flight risk, the district director may, in the exercise of discre-
tion, order the alien released from custody on such conditions as 
the district director may prescribe, including bond in an amount 
sufficient to ensure the alien’s appearance for removal.118 
 
 
 
 
 115. 8 C.F.R. § 241.1 (2000). 
 116. 8 C.F.R. § 241.3. Section 236.1(d)(2)(ii) of 8 C.F.R. will allow the alien to “re-
quest review by the district director of the conditions of his or her release” after the order of 
deportation does become finalized. 
 117. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4. 
 118. Id. 
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In determining whether an alien’s petition for release should be 
granted, § 241.4 sets forth a non-exhaustive list of factors that he 
district director may consider.119 
d. Additional rules. On August 6, 1999, the INS announced ad-
ditional interim procedures—beyond those contained in the afore-
mentioned C.F.R. sections—related to the detention of aliens whose 
deportation is unlikely during the ninety-day removal period.120  
 
 119. These factors include: (1) the nature and seriousness of the alien’s criminal convic-
tions; (2) the alien’s entire criminal history; (3) the sentence(s) imposed for the conviction 
leading to removal and the time actually served for the conviction; (4) the alien’s history of 
failures to appear for court; (5) the alien’s probation history; (6) the nature of any disciplinary 
problems that the alien posed while incarcerated; (7) any evidence of rehabilitative efforts or 
recidivism on the part of the alien; (8) equities in the United States; and (9) the alien’s prior 
immigration violations and history. See id. 
 120. The pertinent parts of these interim procedures, as set forth in their entirety in the 
Appendix to Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390 (3d Cir. 1999), are as follows: 
(1) Pursuant to the provisions of 8 C.F.R. § 241.4, the District Director will con-
tinue to conduct a custody review of administratively final order removal cases before 
the ninety-day removal period mandated by section 241(a)(1) expires for aliens 
whose departure cannot be effected within the removal period. 
(2) These procedures apply to any alien ordered removed who is inadmissible under 
section 212, removable under 237(a)(1)(C), 237(a)(2), or 237(a)(4) or who has 
been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely 
to comply with the order of removal. They cover aliens convicted of an aggravated 
felony offense who are subject to the provisions of old INA section 236(e)(1)–(3), 
and non-aggravated felon aliens with final orders of exclusion. . . . The ninety-day 
review will be conducted pursuant to the instructions set out in the memoranda of 
February 3 and April 30, 1999. District Directors may, in their discretion, interview 
the alien if they believe that an interview would facilitate the custody review. 
(3) Following expiration of the ninety-day removal period, the next scheduled re-
view provided by the District Director shall be nine months from the date of the fi-
nal administrative order of removal or six months after the last review, whichever is 
later. Written notice shall be given to each alien at least 30 days prior to the date of 
the review. . . . The notice shall specify the factors to be considered and explain that 
the alien will be provided the opportunity to demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence that he is not a threat to the community and is likely to comply with the 
removal order. 
(4) For the review discussed in paragraph 3 above, an interview is mandatory and 
the District Director’s preliminary decision will be subject to Headquarters review. 
Thereafter, custody reviews will be conducted every six months, alternating between 
District Director file reviews and a review that includes the opportunity for an inter-
view at the alien’s request and a Headquarters review of detention decisions. . . . 
The District Director has the discretion to schedule further interviews if he deter-
mines they would assist him in reaching a custody determination. 
(5) The alien must be advised that he may submit any information relevant to sup-
port his request for release from detention, either in writing, electronically, by U.S. 
mail (or any combination thereof), or in person if an interview is conducted. The 
alien must also be advised that he may be represented by an attorney, or other per-
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In conjunction with that announcement, the INS also declared an 
“intention to promulgate regulations to the same effect.”121 
 
son at no expense to the government. If an interview has been scheduled, the alien’s 
representative may attend the review at the scheduled time. 
(6) The District Director may delegate custody decisions to the level of the Assistant 
District Director, Deputy Assistant District Director, or those acting in their capac-
ity. Custody determinations will be made by weighing favorable and adverse factors 
to determine whether the detainee has demonstrated by clear and convincing evi-
dence that he does not pose a threat to the community, and is likely to comply with 
the removal order. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.4. The alien’s past failure to cooperate in ob-
taining a travel document shall be considered an adverse factor in determining eligi-
bility for release. See INA § 241(a)(1)(C) Suspension of Period. The fact that the 
alien has a criminal history does not create a presumption in favor of continued de-
tention. 
(7) Within thirty days of the District Director’s custody review, the alien must re-
ceive written notification of a custody decision. . . . A decision to release should 
specify the conditions of release. A decision to detain will clearly delineate the fac-
tors presented by the alien in support of his release, and the reasons for the District 
Director’s decision. 
(8) With respect to those detain decisions that are subject to Headquarters review 
under paragraph 4, the District Director’s determination that the alien should be de-
tained is to be regarded as only preliminary. In those instances, the Regional Direc-
tors will forward the preliminary detain decisions to Headquarters for review. Head-
quarters review will be conducted by Operations and Programs representatives (with 
assistance from the Office of General Counsel as necessary). Where the Headquar-
ters reviewer’s decision concurs with the District Director’s, the Headquarters re-
viewer will write a supporting statement and will seek concurrence from a second 
Headquarters reviewer. Where the two reviewers differ, a panel of three Headquar-
ters reviewers will conduct a further review of the case. The Headquarters panel may 
ratify the District Director’s decision, return the case to the District Director to re-
consider his decision, or determine that additional information is required to make a 
decision. The Headquarters review must be completed within thirty days of file re-
ceipt. The Headquarters review conclusions will be forwarded to the Regional Di-
rector for distribution to and appropriate action by the District Director. 
(9) The District Director will review his decision in light of the Headquarters rec-
ommendations and will notify the alien of the final custody determination within 
thirty days of completion of the Headquarters review. 
(10) The District Director should make every effort to effect the alien’s removal 
both before and after expiration of the removal period. All steps to secure travel 
documents must be fully documented in the alien’s file. However, if the District Di-
rector is unable to secure travel documents locally after making diligent efforts to do 
so, then the case shall be referred to Headquarters OPS/DDP for assistance. More 
detailed instructions will be issued from the Executive Associate Commissioner for 
Operations by separate memorandum. 
(11) On August 30, 1999, and on the last workday of each quarter (September, De-
cember, March, June) each district shall submit a custody review status report to its  
Regional office and to Headquarters. There will be more detailed instructions issued 
on reporting procedures at a later time. 
Id. at 400–01. 
 121. Nguyen v. Fasano, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1108 (S.D. Cal. 2000). 
6DIN-FIN.DOC 12/9/00  1:39 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
1574 
These interim procedures were set forth by the INS shortly after 
the publication of the Western District of Washington’s decision in 
Phan v. Reno,122 which essentially held that the continued detention 
of undeportable deportable aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) was, 
in most cases, unconstitutional.123 The practical effect of Phan was 
that the INS was required to release a large number of undeportable 
detainees,124 and the interim procedures were promulgated to ad-
dress the substantive and procedural due process concerns expressed 
by the Phan court in an effort to stop the ordered release of so many 
aliens. Other courts have addressed these issues as well. 
III. THE CASES AND THE ISSUES THEY RAISE 
As 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) is a fairly new statute, only a handful 
of courts have addressed the issue of its constitutionality and other-
wise interpreted the statute. These courts are split in their treatment 
of § 1231(a)(6). 
A. Views of the Courts on the Indefinite Detention of Aliens 
The courts that have addressed the issue of indefinite detention 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) have expressed three different views on 
the issue. The majority of courts, all federal district courts, have held 
that the language of § 1231(a)(6) permits indefinite detention of 
aliens, but such detention is a violation of the alien’s right of due 
process and is therefore unconstitutional. A minority of courts, in-
cluding two federal circuit courts, have held that the language of  
§ 1231(a)(6) permits the indefinite detention of aliens and that pro-
longed detention under the statute is both lawful and constitutional. 
Finally, two courts have invoked the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance and concluded that the language of § 1231(a)(6) does not 
permit indefinite detention at all. 
 
 122. 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (W.D. Wash. 1999). 
 123. For a limited look at reaction to the Phan ruling, see Alex Tizon, For INS, A Matter 
of Time, SEATTLE TIMES, June 18, 1999, at B1; Patrick McMahon, Court Clarifies Rights of 
Immigrant Ex-Cons, USA TODAY, July 12, 1999, at 7A. 
 124. See Mike Carter & Steve Miletich, Indefinite Detention by INS Is Illegal, SEATTLE 
TIMES, July 10, 1999, at A1 (reporting that in Washington alone, the Phan ruling could ulti-
mately force the INS “to release as many as 120 . . . criminal aliens,” as well as preclude the 
prolonged detention of future criminal aliens ordered deported to countries with which the 
United States has no repatriation agreement). 
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1. Indefinite detention is permitted by § 1231(a)(6) but is a violation 
of an alien’s right to due process 
In the past three years, at least seven United States district courts 
have held that while the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) explicitly 
authorizes the indefinite detention of deportable aliens, such indefi-
nite detention is a violation of those aliens’ due process rights.125 The 
courts that have addressed the issue of indefinite detention under  
§ 1231(a)(6) constitute the majority view. 
One court that held indefinite detention of deportable aliens un-
der the statute unconstitutional was the Western District of Wash-
ington in the aforementioned case of Phan v. Reno.126 Phan is a 
unique case in that, though it was decided at the district court level, 
it was presided over by a group of five district court judges sitting en 
banc. Additionally, the five judges heard oral arguments not on one 
case, but on five consolidated cases, and issued a joint order for those 
five cases.127 
After setting forth the general background for the case, the Phan 
court addressed the statutory and regulatory framework of 8 U.S.C. 
 
 125. These courts are: Kay v. Reno, 94 F. Supp. 2d 546 (M.D. Pa. 2000); Nguyen v. 
Fasano, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (S.D. Cal. 2000); Sengchanh v. Lanier, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1356 
(N.D. Ga. 2000); Hermanowski v. Farquharson, 39 F. Supp. 2d 148 (D. R.I. 1999); Phan v. 
Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (W.D. Wash. 1999); Vo v. Greene, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (D. Co. 
1999); United States v. Zadvydas, 986 F. Supp. 1011 (E.D. La. 1997). In addition to these 
courts, in In re Indefinite Detention Cases, 82 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (C.D. Cal. 2000), the Central 
District of California held that indefinite detention of deportable aliens is unconstitutional 
without specifically addressing whether § 1231(a)(6) permits that indefinite detention. 
 126. 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (W.D. Wash. 1999). 
 127. In setting forth its reasoning for handling the cases as it did, the Phan court wrote 
the following: 
More than one hundred habeas corpus petitions are currently pending in the West-
ern District of Washington wherein aliens ordered deported to countries that have 
refused them admittance challenge the legality of their continued detention by the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). In an order dated April 22, 1999, 
the undersigned judges of the Western District designated five lead cases that pre-
sent issues common to all petitioners and directed the parties to brief and argue  
these common issues together; the remaining cases were stayed pending decisions in 
the lead cases. 
Id. The court later added: 
Due to the great number of cases currently pending in this district that raise the 
same issue, namely whether INS detention of aliens ordered deported to countries 
that have refused them admittance violates substantive or procedural due process, 
we recognize the need to adopt a consistent legal framework to guide our individual 
consideration of these petitions. 
Id. 
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§ 1231(a) and its predecessor, and its accompanying C.F.R. sections. 
Determining that § 1231(a)(6) did permit the potentially indefinite 
detention of the aliens before it, the court then addressed the consti-
tutionality of that detention under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. In concluding that indefinite detention under the 
statute was unconstitutional, the Phan court wrote: 
[A]s the probability that the government can actually deport an 
alien decreases, the government’s interest in detaining that alien 
becomes less compelling and the invasion into the alien’s liberty 
more severe. Dangerousness and flight risk are thus permissible 
considerations and may, in certain situations, warrant continued de-
tention, but only if there is a realistic chance that an alien will be 
deported. Detention by the INS can be lawful only in aid of depor-
tation. Thus, it is “excessive” to detain an alien indefinitely if de-
portation will never occur.128 
In reaching this conclusion, the court rejected the INS’s argu-
ment that the procedures that it had in place at the time were ade-
quate to provide the detained aliens with due process.129 The court  
then promised to provide an “expedited review of the remaining pe-
titions . . . stayed pursuant to the April 22nd and June 29th or-
ders.”130 
Another district court decision holding that indefinite detention 
of deportable aliens is a violation of due process is Kay v. Reno,131 an 
April 2000 decision handed down by the Middle District of Pennsyl-
vania. Kay addressed the detention of Sombat Map Kay, a perma-
nent resident born in Cambodia in 1974. Kay was arrested in 1992 
for armed assault, armed robbery, and breaking and entering and was 
ordered deported in 1996. Distinguishing a Third Circuit Court of 
 
 128. Id. at 1156. 
 129. See id. at 1157–58. The court also rejected an INS argument that the interest of the 
petitioner aliens was “the right to be released into the United States pending [their] removal.” 
In response to this argument, the court stated that the issue was “much more basic—it is sim-
ply the right to be at liberty.” Id. at 1154 (citation omitted). The INS also argued that in re-
viewing the petitioner’s cases, “the Court’s power to inquire into alleged violations of petition-
ers’ substantive due process rights is limited, and the Court should therefore apply a more 
deferential standard of review.” Id. at 1155. The court disagreed, stating that “[w]hile the ple-
nary power doctrine supports judicial deference to the legislative and executive branches on 
substantive immigration matters, such deference does not extend to post-deportation order 
detention.” Id. The court instead applied strict scrutiny. 
 130. Id. at 1158. 
 131. 94 F. Supp. 2d 546 (M.D. Pa. 2000). 
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Appeals decision in which it was held that excludable aliens can be 
detained indefinitely pending deportation,132 the Kay court deter-
mined that Kay was unlikely to be deported anytime soon and there-
fore was facing the possibility of indefinite detention.133 Focusing on 
the holding in Phan and certain provisions of the Bail Reform Act, 
which governs pre-trial detention, the court determined that the 
government’s interest in detaining Kay was outweighed by both his 
right to freedom from physical confinement and the potentially 
lengthy duration of his confinement. Kay’s habeas corpus petition 
was granted and the court ordered that, absent a showing that he 
was likely to be removed in the foreseeable future, the INS must re-
lease Kay from confinement.134 The holdings in Phan and Kay are 
representative of the decisions of the other courts that have held that 
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) permits indefinite detention, but that such 
detention is a violation of an alien’s right to due process. 
2. Indefinite detention is permitted by § 1231(a)(6) and is not a 
violation of an alien’s right to due process 
While at least seven federal district courts have held that contin-
ued detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6), though permissible un-
der the statute, is unconstitutional, at least four courts, including  
two federal appellate courts, have held otherwise.135 These courts 
have held that § 1231(a)(6) does indeed permit indefinite detention 
and that such detention is not a violation of an alien’s right to due 
process. 
The holding in Ho v. Greene136 is representative of the decisions 
of these courts. In Ho, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed 
the habeas petitions of two aliens awaiting deportation in INS deten-
tion, one of whom was a permanent resident before being ordered 
deported. Concluding that “[t]he final removal orders stripped both 
[aliens] of any heightened constitutional status either may have pos-
 
 132. See Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 133. See Kay, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 553. 
 134. See id. at 557. 
 135. These courts include: Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045 (10th Cir. 2000); Zadvydas v. 
Underdown, 185 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 1999); Villafuerte v. INS, 71 F. Supp. 2d 573 (W.D. La. 
1999); and Cholak v. United States, No. 98–365, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7424 (E.D. La. May 
18, 1998). 
 136. 204 F.3d 1045 (10th Cir. 2000). 
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sessed prior to the entry of the final removal order,”137 the Ho court 
wrote: “The applicable statutes authorize the continued, indefinite 
detention of both Petitioners. Because Petitioners have no liberty in-
terest in the right they are asserting, their due process claims fail. 
Consequently, there is no constitutional impediment to Petitioners’ 
continued detention.”138 In making this ruling, the Tenth Circuit re-
jected the petitioners’ arguments that the Attorney General lacks 
statutory authority to detain aliens indefinitely pending the execution 
of a final removal order and that, in the alternative, the statute is 
ambiguous as to the length of detention permitted and, as such, a 
reasonable time limit should be read into the statute. 
In Zadvydas v. Underdown, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
addressing the case of Kestutis Zadvydas, reached a similar conclu-
sion supported by a similar argument, holding that “once a resident 
alien . . . is—concededly in adherence with procedural and substan-
tive due process—ordered deported and that order becomes final, 
the resident alien may claim no greater rights than an excludable 
alien in like circumstances.”139 In so holding, the court expressly re-
jected the petitioner’s argument that even after deportation orders 
have been finalized, resident aliens are entitled to a greater degree of 
substantive due process protection than excludable aliens. The court 
also rejected Zadvydas’ contention that his detention amounted to 
nothing more than punishment without trial in contravention of his 
right to substantive due process and his liberty interest in being free 
from physical confinement. In sum, both of these decisions stand for 
the proposition that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) permits the indefinite 
detention of deportable aliens, and that such detention, though pos-
sibly indefinite, does not result in a violation of an alien’s constitu-
tional right to substantive due process. 
3. Section 1231(a)(6) does not permit indefinite detention of aliens 
Two courts, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Eastern 
District of California, have applied the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance and held that the language of § 1231(a)(6) does not even 
permit the indefinite detention of unwanted aliens. The doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance, in brief, requires that courts “interpret 
 
 137. Id. at 1059. 
 138. Id. at 1060. 
 139. Underdown, 185 F.3d at 285. 
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statutes in a manner that avoids deciding substantial constitutional 
questions.”140 
The first court to invoke the doctrine of constitutional avoidance 
in a § 1231(a)(6) context was the Eastern District of California in 
Sok v. INS.141 The court that “[w]here an otherwise acceptable 
construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, 
the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless 
such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” The 
Sok court then held that “[c]onstruing § 1231(a)(6) as vesting the 
Attorney General with the authority to detain deportable aliens be-
yond the removal period with no fixed time limitations would raise a 
serious constitutional question.”142 The court eventually held that “a 
literal reading of § 1231(a)(6) does not expressly vest the Attorney 
General with unlimited power to detain.”143 
Six months later, in Ma v. Reno, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals similarly decided that § 1231(a)(6) does not permit indefinite 
detention of deportable aliens. In doing so, the Ma court employed 
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, stressing the importance of 
construing a statute in a manner that will avoid raising constitutional 
problems “so long as the saving construction is not ‘plainly contrary 
to the intent of Congress.’”144 The court wrote: 
We hold that Congress did not grant the INS authority to detain 
indefinitely aliens who . . . have entered the United States and can-
not be removed to their native land pursuant to a repatriation 
agreement. To the contrary, we construe the statute as providing 
the INS with authority to detain aliens only for a reasonable time 
beyond the statutory removal period. In cases in which the alien 
has already entered the United States and there is no reasonable 
likelihood that a foreign government will accept the alien’s return 
in the reasonably foreseeable future, we conclude that the statute 
 
 140. Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Edward J. DeBartolo 
Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); Res-
cue Army v. Municipal Court of L.A., 331 U.S. 549 (1947); United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 
241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916). For a scholarly discussion on the basics of the doctrine of constitu-
tional avoidance, see Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 
1003 (1994). 
 141. 67 F. Supp. 2d 1166 (E.D. Cal. 1999). 
 142. Id. at 1168 (citations omitted). 
 143. Id. at 1169. 
 144. 208 F.3d at 827 (citing United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 
(1994)). 
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does not permit the Attorney General to hold the alien beyond the 
statutory removal period. Rather, the alien must be released subject 
to the supervisory authority provided in the statute.145 
As the Ma court invoked the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, it 
did not address the issues of substantive or procedural due process as 
they relate to the detention of aliens under § 1231(a)(6). In sum, 
these two courts disagreed with a number of other federal tribunals 
and held that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) does not permit the indefinite 
detention of aliens ordered deported. 
B. Other Issues Raised in These Cases 
In addition to the issues of whether the Attorney General has 
statutory authority to detain deportable aliens indefinitely pending 
deportation and whether that prolonged detention violates the Fifth 
Amendment to the Constitution, three other significant issues are 
raised in the aforementioned cases: (1) whether deportable aliens 
have greater rights than excludable aliens; (2) whether it is fair to re-
quire the deportable alien to bear the burden of proving that he or 
she is not a danger to the community or a flight risk before release 
into the community to await deportation may be effected; and (3) 
whether the indefinite detention of deportable aliens violates interna-
tional law.146 
1. Do deportable aliens have greater rights than excludable aliens? 
The two circuit courts that held that indefinite detention of a 
deportable alien is not a violation of his constitutional rights did so 
because, in the view of those courts, “once a resident alien . . . [is] 
ordered deported and that order becomes final, the resident alien 
 
 145. Id. at 821–22. In its opinion, the Ma court stated that the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance has been employed in immigration contexts in the past, giving as examples the fol-
lowing cases: United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 199 (1957) (reading a limitation into 
a statute which authorized the INS to demand information from deportable aliens—the limita-
tion held that aliens did not have to answer questions that were not relevant to a legitimate 
governmental purpose); Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854–56 (1985) (avoiding a constitu-
tional question by holding that an immigration parole regulation does not permit race-based 
discrimination); Romero v. INS, 39 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 1994) (reading a limitation into a stat-
ute such that an alien who refused to answer questions unrelated to her visa status was pro-
tected from deportation). 
 146. A few cases have also wrestled with whether or not Congress’s plenary power ex-
tends to post-deportation order detention. See infra note 149. 
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may claim no greater rights than an excludable alien in like circum-
stances.”147 
In Underdown, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals gave the fol-
lowing justification for its decision that deportable aliens have no 
more rights than excludable aliens: 
In the [case of an alien ordered deported because of the commis-
sion of a crime], the national interest in effectuating deportation is 
identical regardless of whether the alien was once resident or ex-
cludable. When a former resident alien is—with the adequate and 
unchallenged procedural due process to which his assertion of a 
right to remain in this country entitles him—finally ordered de-
ported, the decision has irrevocably been made to expel him from 
the national community. Nothing remains but to effectuate this de-
cision. The need to expel such an alien is identical, from a national 
sovereignty perspective, to the need to remove an excludable alien 
who has been finally and properly ordered returned to his country 
of origin. The fact that deportation cannot be immediately effectu-
ated would not seem to recreate a distinction in the government’s 
interest regarding excludable aliens and resident aliens.148 
Other courts, such as Phan, have strongly disagreed. These courts 
have held that a resident alien’s right to substantive due process is  
not extinguished by a final deportation order.  It is retained until ac-
tual physical expulsion is effected.149 
2. Is it fair to put the burden of proof on the alien? 
Under 8 C.F.R. § 241.4, an alien held past the ninety-day re-
moval period can gain a release if he or she, to the satisfaction of the 
district directors, “demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence 
that the release would not pose a danger to the community or a sig-
nificant flight risk.”150 Courts differ on their views toward the fairness 
of this procedure—i.e., the fairness of placing the burden of proof on 
the alien to demonstrate that his or her release will not pose a danger 
 
 147. Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 285 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 148. Id. at 296. 
 149. Related to this argument is another raised by the courts: whether the plenary power 
of Congress in the immigration realm extends to post-deportation order detention. Some 
courts, such as Zadvydas v. Underdown, clearly believe that it does. See 185 F.3d at 294. At 
least one judge—Justice Brorby of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals—disagrees, as evi-
denced by his dissent in Ho v. Greene. See 204 F.3d 1045, 1062 n.1 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 150. 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 (2000). 
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to the community or a significant risk of flight. For example, in 
Nguyen v. Fasano,151 the court stated: 
Although there may be other considerations warranting continued 
detention if a deportation is realistic, the issue here is who bears 
what burden if deportation is not realistic. Where effecting removal 
is frustrated to such an extent, the petitioner should presumptively 
be released unless the government can show why he or she should 
not be released. In such a case, the government should bear the 
burden of showing that achieving its remaining interests, for exam-
ple, preventing flight and protecting the community, are not exces-
sive in relation to the restriction of Petitioners’ liberty.152 
Other courts, however, in cases such as Zadvydas v. Underdown, 
Zadvydas v. Caplinger,153 and Sengchanh v. Lanier,154 though not ex-
pressly stating that it is fair to place the burden of proof on the alien, 
have proceeded to analyze deportation cases under the assumption 
that there is no unfairness in 8 C.F.R. § 241.4. 
3. Does indefinite detention violate international law? 
In Ma, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of the detention of 
criminal deportable aliens from the point of view of international 
law, arguing that holding aliens indefinitely is a violation of that law. 
The court first addressed the relationship between Congressional 
legislation and international law when it wrote: 
In interpreting the statute to include a reasonable time limitation, 
we are also influenced by amicus curiae Human Rights Watch’s ar-
gument that we should apply the well-established Charming Betsy 
rule of statutory construction which requires that we generally con-
strue Congressional legislation to avoid violating international law. 
We have reaffirmed this rule on several occasions. In United States  
v. Thomas, we explained that we adhere to this principle “out of re-
spect for other nations.”155 
The court next pointed out that international law generally pro-
hibits indefinite detention when it stated: “We recently recognized 
 
 151. 84 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (S.D. Cal. 2000). 
 152. Id. at 1111. 
 153. 986 F. Supp. 1011 (E.D. La. 1997). 
 154. 89 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2000). 
 155. Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815, 829–30 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. 
Thomas, 893 F.2d 1066, 1069 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
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that ‘a clear international prohibition’ exists against prolonged and 
arbitrary detention. Furthermore, Article 9 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), which the 
United States has ratified, provides that ‘no one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest and detention.’”156 Finally, the Ma court stated that 
in the case of deportable criminal aliens, construing the statute in a 
way that permits indefinite detention of these aliens likely violates 
the international prohibition on “prolonged and arbitrary deten-
tion.” It wrote: 
In the present case, construing the statute to authorize the indefi-
nite detention of removable aliens might violate international law. 
In Martinez, we expressed our approval of a district court decision 
in this circuit holding that “individuals imprisoned for years with-
out being charged were arbitrarily detained” in violation of interna-
tional law. Given the strength of the rule of international law, our  
construction of the statute renders it consistent with the Charming 
Betsy rule.157 
Thus, the court urged, international law prohibits the indefinite de-
tention of aliens such as Kim Ho Ma and Kestutis Zadvydas. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Under the current state of the law, it is unclear which of the 
above views on the indefinite detention of deportable aliens is the 
most correct. Indeed, courts on all sides of the issue have freely ad-
mitted that there is no strong Supreme Court authority that directly 
supports their views.158 While a clear answer will not be available un-
til the Supreme Court addresses the issue, a look at the law currently 
in existence demonstrates that the view set forth by Zadvydas v. Un-
derdown and Ho v. Greene  is the proper view. To put it another way, 
a look at the law as outlined by Congress and the Supreme Court fa-
 
 156. Id. at 829 (quoting Martinez v. Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373, 1384 (9th Cir. 1998); 
International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights, opened for signature, Dec. 19, 1966, 99 
U.N.T.S. 171, entered into force, Mar. 23, 1976, at Art. 9(1)) (footnote omitted). 
 157. Id. (quoting Martinez, 141 F.3d at 1384). 
 158. For example, after addressing a string of Supreme Court cases regarding the right of 
the United States to deport aliens, the Zadvydas v. Underdown court offered a lack of authority 
as support for its holding: “Nothing in these cases suggests that a resident alien has a broadly 
privileged constitutional status relative to excludable aliens, or is constitutionally entitled to 
more favorable treatment when both the right asserted and the governmental interest are iden-
tical to those in the parallel case of an excludable alien.” 185 F.3d 279, 295 (5th Cir. 1999). 
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vors the view that there is no violation of the Fifth Amendment 
when deportable aliens are detained pending deportation past the 
statutory ninety-day removal period, even when that period of deten-
tion appears to be unlikely to end in the near future. 
Specifically, there is support in the law for the proposition that 
deportable aliens have no greater due process rights than those ex-
cludable aliens who the Supreme Court says can be detained indefi-
nitely. Additionally, allowing the release of deportable aliens into the 
United States is a direct violation of federal constitutional law. Fi-
nally, international law does not require the release of these aliens, 
and the interim procedures promulgated by the INS in August of 
1999 provide more than enough substantive and procedural due 
process protections to satisfy the established standards. On these 
grounds, a conclusion that deportable aliens can be held well past 
the ninety-day removal period is constitutionally sound. 
A. The Government’s Interests in Detaining a Deportable Alien Are 
the Same as Those in Detaining an Excludable Alien 
Though some courts disagree that after an order of deportation 
has been entered the rights and interests of deportable aliens are the 
same as those belonging to excludable aliens, it is apparent that, un-
der the law, the rights of these respective groups of aliens are in fact 
the same. It is also apparent that once a deportation order is entered, 
the government’s interest in pre-deportation detention of a deport-
able alien is the same interest that it has in the detention of an ex-
cludable alien. Consequently, it is unreasonable to assume that the 
same government interest will require different results when applied 
to excludable and deportable aliens who enjoy the same constitu-
tional rights. 
Before deportation, a resident alien has a presumptive right to be 
at large within the borders of the United States. An excludable alien, 
on the other hand, has no such right or expectation, only a hope of 
entering the borders of the nation. An order of deportation, how-
ever, strips a resident alien of the right to be at large within the 
United States.159 Once a deportation order has been entered, then, 
 
 159. This proposition is supported by statutory and case law. For instance, 8 C.F.R.  
§ 1.1(p) states: 
The term lawfully admitted for permanent residence means the status of having been 
lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States as an 
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with respect to the right to enter or remain in the United States, the 
deportable alien has no greater right or claim to entry than an ex-
cludable alien ordered removed. For example, when Kim Ho Ma be-
came a resident alien, he gained the rights enjoyed by all resident 
aliens, namely the right to both procedural and substantive due 
process under the Fifth Amendment, as well as the right to be free 
within the borders of the United States. When the government initi-
ated deportation proceedings against him, Ma was guaranteed due 
process protections during those proceedings, and there is no con-
tention that these rights were violated. Once the deportation order 
was entered, however, Ma lost the right to be free within the United 
States, and as such was similar to an excludable alien ordered ex-
cluded from the United States. At that point, neither Ma nor an ex-
cludable alien had any right to remain within the borders of the 
United States. 
Additionally, once an order of deportation has been entered, the 
government’s interest in removing the individual from the United 
States is the same, regardless of whether the alien is deportable or 
excludable. As one court put it: 
In the circumstances presented here, the national interest in effec-
tuating deportation is identical regardless of whether the alien was 
once resident or excludable. When a former resident alien is—with 
the adequate and unchallenged procedural due process to which his 
assertion of a right to remain in this country entitles him—finally 
ordered deported, the decision has irrevocably been made to expel 
him from the national community. Nothing remains but to effectu-
ate this decision. The need to expel such an alien is identical, from 
a national sovereignty perspective, to the need to remove an ex-
cludable alien who has been finally and properly ordered returned 
to his country of origin. . . . Whether the party to be deported is an 
excludable or a former resident, the United States has properly 
made its decision and earnestly wishes—if for no other reason than 
to save the cost of detention—to deport the detainee.160 
 
 
immigrant in accordance with the immigration laws, such status not having 
changed. Such status terminates upon entry of a final administrative order of exclusion 
or deportation. 
(second emphasis added). In the case of aliens such as Zadvydas and Ma, 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(p) 
means that status as a resident alien disappears upon the entry of an order of deportation. 
 160. Underdown, 185 F.3d at 296 (citation omitted). 
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The United States Supreme Court expressed a similar sentiment 
when it wrote that the “power to exclude aliens and the power to 
expel them rest upon one foundation, are derived from one source, 
are supported by the same reasons, and are in truth but parts of one 
and the same power.”161 In this context, the government’s interests 
include protecting the nation from recidivism and preventing aliens 
from absconding, as well as ending an ongoing violation of immigra-
tion laws.162 This is true whether the alien is being held as excludable 
or deportable. 
In sum, the government’s interest in both deportation and exclu-
sion contexts is the protection of United States citizens and efficient 
administration of United States immigration laws, both of which are 
legitimate, narrowly tailored interests that permit detention of aliens. 
Similarly, excludable and deportable aliens stand in the same posi-
tion—both lack a right to be free within the borders of the United 
States and enjoy only a general right to be free from detention. The 
United States Supreme Court has decided that those lacking a right 
to be free within the United States can be detained when they pre-
sent a danger to the community or a risk of flight,163 meaning that 
detaining these individuals, whether deportable or excludable, is 
permissible. 
In the cases presented above, some aliens have argued that the 
right they are trying to assert is not the right to be free in the United 
States, but the right to be free from detention. In the context in 
which the aliens are seeking release, however, this is a distinction 
without a difference. To release the aliens from detention is to re-
lease them back into the United States—as they, by the very nature 
of their undeportable status, cannot be released elsewhere—which is 
a violation of federal law.164 Regardless, once the deportation order is 
entered, the aliens are left in identical positions, and the right to de-
prive them of physical liberty is identical. As Part II(D)(3) of this 
Comment indicates, the law is clear that, in this situation, detention 
is permissible. 
 
 
 
 161. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1892) (emphasis added). 
 162. See infra Part IV.B. 
 163. See supra Part II.D.3. 
 164. See infra Part IV.B. 
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A number of courts have attacked the above reasoning, set forth 
primarily in Underdown, as unsound.165 However, the defenses that 
they give for doing so are as suspect as they claim the Underdown 
reasoning to be. For example, in Nguyen v. Fasano,166 the Southern 
District of California wrote: 
This court is not persuaded that excludable and deportable aliens 
should be treated identically. “Once an alien gains admission to our 
country and begins to develop the ties that go with permanent 
residence, his constitutional status changes accordingly.” For ex-
ample, an alien being deported has several rights that an alien being 
excluded does not, including designating the country of deporta-
tion, the possibility of departing voluntarily, and the ability to seek 
suspension of deportation. The reason excludable aliens do not en-
joy most constitutional rights is the “entry fiction”: “because ex-
cludable aliens are deemed under the entry doctrine not to be pre-
sent on United States territory, a holding that they have no 
substantive right to be free from immigration detention reasonably 
follows.” Permanent resident aliens, on the other hand, have al-
ready been admitted to the country and are therefore “present on 
United States territory.” This court is not persuaded by the Fifth 
Circuit’s conclusion in Zadvydas that a final order of deportation 
erases any rights a permanent resident alien previously possessed. 
“[G]iven that resident aliens have acknowledged constitutional 
rights, we cannot make those rights vanish by the legal expedient of 
a final order of deportation.”167 
While the Nguyen court makes some good points, its argument is 
ultimately untenable. For example, one of the Nguyen court’s main 
supports for its argument that deportable aliens have rights different 
from those belonging to excludable aliens is the fact that, in its view, 
“an alien being deported has several rights that an alien being ex-
cluded does not, including designating the country of deportation, 
the possibility of departing voluntarily, and the ability to seek sus-
pension of deportation.” However, a close look at the United States 
 
 165. The most oft-cited pro-release decision, Phan, did not address the issue in any sig-
nificant detail, but simply assumed that the rights of deportable aliens to due process protec-
tion continued with them until actual physical deportation was effected. The court stated: “No 
authority supports the government’s position that aliens somehow ‘assimilate’ to excludable 
status once they have been ordered deported, thereby relinquishing their constitutional 
rights.” Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1154 (W.D. Wash. 1999). 
 166. 84 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (S.D. Cal. 2000). 
 167. Id. at 1109–10 (citations omitted). 
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Code shows that this is, to some degree, a false premise. To begin 
with, the Nguyen court broadly states that deportable aliens have the 
right to depart voluntarily. This is true, but not as true as the court 
intimates. For instance, under 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (a)(1), not all de-
portable aliens can voluntarily depart. That section states: 
The Attorney General may permit an alien voluntarily to depart the 
United States at the alien’s own expense under this subsection, in 
lieu of being subject to proceedings under section 1229a of this ti-
tle or prior to the completion of such proceedings, if the 
alien is not deportable under section 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) or section 
1227(a)(4)(B) of this title.168 
For the purposes of this Comment, it is important to note that 
those aliens who cannot voluntarily depart, namely aliens deportable 
under §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) and 1227(a)(4)(B), are many of the 
same aliens that the Attorney General is authorized to hold past the 
ninety-day removal period.169 Thus, the court is incorrect when it in-
timates that all of the aliens being held past the ninety-day period 
have rights to voluntary departure that excludable aliens do not. Ad-
ditionally, while excludable aliens do not have the right to “volun-
tary departure,” § 1229c (a)(4) plainly states that “[n]othing in this 
paragraph shall be construed as preventing [an excludable] alien 
from withdrawing [his or her] application for admission in accor-
dance with section 1225(a)(4) of this title.”170 Thus, the practical ef-
fect of the code is that at least some excludable aliens do have the 
right to voluntarily cease efforts to enter the United States, and 
thereby depart the country voluntarily. These excludable aliens can 
withdraw their application and physically return to their countries of 
origin. Deportable aliens can agree not to remain in the United 
States and physically return to their countries of origin. Either way, 
the decision to not remain in the United States is voluntary, meaning 
from a practical standpoint, both groups of aliens enjoy the same 
right to “voluntary departure.” It is clear, then, that the Nguyen 
court was not wholly correct when it made the broad assertion that  
deportable aliens have the right to depart voluntarily when exclud-
able aliens do not. 
 
 168. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (a)(1) (1994) (emphasis added). 
 169. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) permits, at the discretion of the Attorney General, the con-
tinued detention of aliens “removable under section[s] . . . 1227(a)(2), [and] 1227(a)(4).” 
 170. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c (a)(4). 
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The Nguyen court also premises its holding that excludable and 
deportable aliens do not share the same rights on the fact that, in its 
view, deportable aliens have the right to designate the country to 
which they will be deported while excludable aliens do not. While 
this is true, it is well established that a deportable alien does not have 
a right to be deported to the country of his choice or not be de-
ported at all. As the case of Kestutis Zadvydas demonstrates, the 
United States will seek to deport an alien to any country, within rea-
son, that will take him or her.171 The fact that an alien wants to be 
deported to Germany, for example, does not mean that deportation 
to Lithuania is precluded when Germany refuses to take the alien in 
question. Additionally, it is important to note that the right to re-
cord a non-binding preference for which country an alien will be de-
ported to is a far cry from the fundamental liberty interests protected 
by the Fifth Amendment. The fact that an alien has been given the 
right to voice an opinion as to where he or she would like to end up 
is not so intertwined with due process that the second necessarily ac-
companies the first. Again, the Nguyen court’s reasoning—and basis 
for its decision that detaining an alien well past the removal period is 
unconstitutional—is seriously flawed. 
In sum, there is simply no convincing authority to support the 
proposition that a deportable alien retains the full panoply or rights 
he or she enjoyed prior to the order after a finalized order of depor-
tation is entered; in fact, there is strong authority to support a theory 
that the opposite is true. Again, this situation may always be unclear 
until it is addressed directly by the Supreme Court, but the weight of 
existing authority shows that it is reasonable to find that deportable 
aliens stand in the same position as excludable aliens, and just as rea-
sonable to conclude that, like excludable aliens, deportable aliens can 
be held in INS custody for prolonged periods of time. 
B. To Release Deportable Aliens into the United States Makes a 
Mockery of the Constitution and Creates a Violation of Federal Law 
To release deportable aliens back into the community when de-
portation is not possible within the ninety-day removal period also 
makes a mockery of the deportation process, the United States’ im-
migration laws and procedure, and ultimately the Constitution of the 
 
 171. In the case of Zadvydas, the INS has looked to at least four different nations as pos-
sible destinations for Zadvydas. 
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United States. For example, when an alien is ordered deported, he or 
she loses the right to be at large within the borders of the United 
States. However, if that alien is released from prison and allowed 
back into the community until a deportation that may never occur is 
effected, he or she “will be awarded the very right denied them as a 
result of the final orders of removal.”172 Such a result would, for all 
intents and purposes, make ineffective the final order of removal. 
The same would also force the United States to “violate its national 
sovereignty”173 and would, at first in theory but later in practice, 
cause the United States to lose control of its right to exclude and ul-
timately the right to control its borders.174 
Furthermore, to release deportable aliens back into the commu-
nity results in a direct violation of the law as established by the Su-
preme Court. In INS v. Lopez-Mendez,175 the United States Supreme 
Court held that “[t]he purpose of deportation is not to punish past 
transgressions but rather to put an end to a continuing violation of 
the immigration laws.”176 By this statement the Court means that an 
alien ordered deported violates United States immigration laws by 
remaining in the United States. The Court later reaffirmed this posi-
tion in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee,177 in 
which it held that “in all cases, deportation is necessary in order to 
bring to an end an ongoing violation of United States law.”178 The 
release of deportable aliens into the borders of the United States, af-
ter they have been ordered deported, then, “is thus a continuing vio-
lation of the immigration laws.”179 
Neither the violation of federal law nor the invalidating of an or-
der of deportation is desirable or supportive of Congress’s constitu-
tional right to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturaliza-
tion. . .throughout the United States.”180 Indeed, to release aliens 
who have been ordered deported back into the United States effec-
 
 172. Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1058 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 173. Villafuerte v. INS, 71 F. Supp. 2d 573, 576 (W.D. La. 1999) (citing Gisbert v. 
United States Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1447 (5th Cir. 1993)). 
 174. See Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 975 (11th Cir. 1984), aff’d 472 U.S. 846 
(1985). 
 175. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). 
 176. Id. at 1039. 
 177. 525 U.S. 471 (1999). 
 178. Id. at 491. 
 179. Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185 F.3d 279, 297 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 180. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
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tively denies Congress the right to exclude unwanted aliens, and 
does so in contravention of Article I of the Constitution.181 
C. International Law Does Not Require the Release of Deportable 
Aliens 
As the Ma court explained, international law generally prohibits 
the prolonged detention of deportable aliens such as Zadvydas and 
Ma. While the United States does generally seek to abide by interna-
tional law, with respect to the interpretation of 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1231(a)(6), international law, contrary to the Ma court’s thinking, 
has no controlling weight and, in fact, does not even apply. 
In Gisbert v. United States Attorney General,182 a case involving 
the prolonged detention of an excludable alien, the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals addressed the applicability of international law to 
the detention of aliens unwanted in the United States. The court 
wrote: 
Public international law has been incorporated into the common 
law of the United States, and we are thus bound to construe the 
federal common law, to the extent reasonably possible, to avoid 
violating principles of public international law. Public international 
law controls, however, only “where there is no treaty and no con-
trolling executive or legislative act or judicial decision . . . .”183 
Other decisions, including decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court and, interestingly enough, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals—the court that stated in Ma that international law dictates a  
ruling against continued detention—support and accept this princi-
ple of executive and legislative priority.184 
 
 181. Some aliens have argued that the fact that the Attorney General has discretion to 
release them from detention when it is determined that they are no longer a danger or a risk of 
flight necessarily gives them a liberty interest in being free within the United States. As the Ho 
court pointed out in a footnote, there is no clear authority stating that such a situation creates 
a liberty interest. See Ho v. Greene, 204 F.3d 1045, 1060 n.9 (10th Cir. 2000). In support of 
this proposition, the Ho court references Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983), 
which held that no liberty interest was created by a statute that allowed a decision-maker to 
deny requested relief with unfettered discretion. 
 182. 988 F.2d 1437 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 183. Id. at 1447 (quoting Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(emphasis added). 
 184. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also Barrera-Echavarria v. 
Rison, 44 F.3d 1441, 1450–51 (9th Cir. 1995); Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in  
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As was the case in Gisbert, the detention of deportable aliens un-
der 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) involves federal executive, legislative, and 
judicial decisions that supersede principles of international law. The 
provisions of § 1231(a)(6) granting the Attorney General the right 
to detain certain aliens past the ninety-day removal period involved a 
decision by the legislative branch of the federal government to per-
mit such detention. Further, the Attorney General’s actions in draft-
ing and following the guidelines found in 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 to effec-
tuate this detention under the statute involve decisions of the 
executive branch.185 On these grounds the aforementioned section of 
Gisbert holds that international law, while persuasive, is not manda-
tory precedent in this case, nor does it require courts to refuse to fol-
low the law as set forth by Congress. 
D. The August 6, 1999, Interim Procedures Protect the Rights of 
Deportable Aliens to the Degree that Detention Does Not Offend Due 
Process 
Though, as this Comment argues, the continued detention of 
deportable aliens past the ninety-day removal period does not result 
in a violation of an alien’s right to due process, the interim proce-
dures promulgated by the INS on August 6, 1999, only solidify the 
INS’s right to detain such aliens without violating the Fifth Amend-
ment. In Phan, the court expressed concerns regarding the process 
of determining when a deportable alien should be released into the 
community pending deportation. It wrote: 
We have . . . concerns about the quality of the review afforded by 
the INS to the petitioners. Indeed, our review of the record con-
firms that the INS does not meaningfully and impartially review the 
petitioners’ custody status. The absence of any individualized as-
sessment or consideration of the petitioners’ situations in light of 
 
Nicaragua v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Alvarez-Mendez v. Stock, 941 
F.2d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 1991); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1453–55 (11th Cir. 
1986). 
 185. Again, 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 states: “The district director may continue in custody any 
alien . . . removable under section 237 (a)(1)(c), 237 (a)(2), or 237 (a)(4) of the Act, or who 
presents a significant risk of noncompliance with the order of removal, beyond the removal 
period, as necessary, until removal from the United States.” The wording of this section is 
clear, and cannot be interpreted in a way that would not give the District Director the discre-
tion of holding an alien beyond the end of the removal period. Thus, a decision of the execu-
tive branch has gone against a rule of international law, and has therefore made the Charming 
Betsy rule referred to by the Ma court inapplicable to this case. 
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the pertinent factors set forth in the regulations violates their pro-
cedural due process rights. At a minimum, each petitioner is enti-
tled to a fair and impartial hearing before an immigration judge at 
which he or she can present evidence to support release pending 
deportation. The immigration judge must actually consider the fac-
tors set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 and explain how they apply to 
each petitioner’s unique circumstances. Petitioners also must be 
able to appeal any adverse denial of a release request to the BIA.186 
Ultimately the court concluded that without the enumerated 
protections, the prolonged detention of unwanted aliens is unconsti-
tutional on due process grounds. The interim procedures, released 
just one month after the publication of the Phan decision, address 
these concerns and alleviate them by providing the aliens with more 
substantive and procedural due process protections than they  
previously enjoyed, enough protections to make continued detention 
not unconstitutional.187 
One of the Phan court’s major concerns involved the absence of 
an individualized assessment of a petitioner alien’s individual situa-
tion. The interim procedures address this concern in a number of 
ways. First, Interim Procedure (1) states that “the District Director 
will continue to conduct a custody review of administratively final 
order removal cases before the ninety-day removal period . . . ex-
pires.”188 Interim Procedure (4) further provides that, after the expi-
ration of the ninety-day removal period, the District Director shall 
hold an additional review in which “an interview [with the individual 
alien] is mandatory and the District Director’s preliminary decision 
will be subject to Headquarters review.”189 Thus, this requires that 
the alien be provided with at least two more instances of personal re-
view than they previously had, including face-to-face contact with a 
reviewer whose decision can be appealed. Moreover, after the first 
post-ninety-day interview, “custody reviews [are to be] conducted 
every six months,”190 meaning that individualized assessment may 
continue as long as detention continues. 
Another of the Phan court’s concerns addressed the alien’s abil-
ity to present evidence to support his or her release from detention 
 
 186. Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1157 (W.D. Wash. 1999). 
 187. See supra note 120 for the full text of the procedures. 
 188. Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 400 app. (3d Cir. 1999). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
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pending deportation. The interim procedures also address this con-
cern. Specifically, Interim Procedure (3) states that “the alien will be 
provided the opportunity to demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence that he is not a threat to the community and is likely to 
comply with the removal order.”191 Additionally, with respect to the 
semi-annual reviews following the ninety-day removal period, In-
terim Procedure (5) states that, when notified of each review, “[t]he 
alien must be advised that he may submit any information relevant to 
support his request for release from detention.”192 Thus, there are no 
restrictions in the interim procedures to an alien’s ability to present 
evidence favorable to himself or herself. 
Additionally, the Phan court also felt that a reviewing body 
should specifically “consider the factors set forth at 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 
and explain how they apply to each petitioner’s unique circum-
stances.”193 Interim Procedure (1) specifically states that review 
should be conducted “[p]ursuant to the provisions of 8 C.F.R.  
§ 241.4,”194 and Interim Procedure (7) states that any “decision to 
detain will clearly delineate the factors presented by the alien in sup-
port of his release, and the reasons for the District Director’s deci-
sion.”195 This third concern, then, is also alleviated by the interim 
procedures. 
Finally, with respect to overall fairness toward the alien, the in-
terim procedures are more than adequate to allow the INS to detain 
aliens pending deportation without violating the sanctimonious rules 
of due process, even if that detention appears to be indefinite. In-
terim Procedure (8), for example, provides that “the District Direc-
tor’s determination that the alien should be detained is to be re-
garded as only preliminary,”196 as at least two more INS officials 
must approve the decision before detention can continue. In the case 
of disagreement, an entire panel will examine the issue. Clearly, this 
procedure provides for more than a “summary review by an INS offi-
cer”197 of a particular alien’s situation. Additionally, the interim pro-
cedures provide for some forgiveness of past transgressions, as Pro-
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cedure (6) states that an alien’s criminal history “does not create a 
presumption in favor of continued detention.”198 In sum, the interim 
procedures are more than fair to those aliens detained past the re-
moval period and are comprehensive enough to allow the INS to de-
termine which aliens it will be safe to release. 
In complying with the concerns of Phan and making the deten-
tion process much more fair to the aliens, the interim procedures 
provide criminal aliens detained past the ninety-day removal period 
with greater procedural and substantive due process protections than 
ever before. This being the case, to release dangerous and recidivist 
aliens would be to subject the citizens and community of the United 
States to possible danger when doing so is unnecessary. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Until the United States Supreme Court undertakes to address 
the issues presented by these alien deportation cases, the law will 
continue to be unclear and the courts split. When the Court finally 
does address the issue, however, it will likely hold that the indefinite 
detention of deportable aliens is constitutional. The interim proce-
dures announced by the INS on August 6, 1999, clearly address and 
alleviate the concerns regarding due process that have been expressed 
by Phan and other courts. These procedures provide deportable 
aliens who have been detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) with 
more detailed protections than they enjoyed before the announce-
ment of the procedures. Moreover, the fact that resident aliens or-
dered deported enjoy no more rights than excludable aliens and in 
fact stand in the same shoes as excludable aliens, further supports the 
view that pre-deportation detention is constitutional. 
Additionally, as the Fifth Circuit put it in Underdown, the “pres-
ence [of aliens ordered deported] in this country is . . . a continuing 
violation of the immigration laws.”199 Further, as the Tenth Circuit 
held, “[i]f their . . . petitions are granted, [the aliens ordered de-
ported] will be awarded the very right denied them as a result of the 
final orders of removal, i.e., the right to be at large in the United 
States.”200 Requiring the INS to release criminal aliens whose depor-
tation is unlikely strips the government of its constitutionally-
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guaranteed power to “establish an uniform Rule of Naturaliza-
tion . . . throughout the United States,”201 because the government 
is forced to allow aliens that it wants to exclude to run free, which in 
turn results in “our losing control over our borders.”202 While con-
sidering the due process rights of aliens is important, it is clear that 
in evaluating deportation procedures, a court’s balancing of factors 
“must weigh heavily in the balance that control over matters of im-
migration is a sovereign prerogative.”203 The right of the government 
to effectuate its constitutionally guaranteed powers, then, must take 
precedent over a deportable alien’s right to be free. 
In conclusion, it is not the purpose of this Comment to argue 
that all aliens held detained beyond the ninety-day removal period 
are inherently evil criminals or are more than likely to commit addi-
tional crimes upon their release. Nor is it the purpose of this Com-
ment to argue that all aliens detainable beyond the removal period 
should absolutely be detained, forever if possible. To put it simply, 
there are a few aliens who, for the good of the nation, need to be de-
tained, and detention should be available in the case of these aliens. 
To implement the doctrine of constitutional avoidance and hold that 
there is no detention past the removal period would be to allow 
these individuals to be set free to the detriment of the nation and in 
violation of our immigration laws. Similarly, to hold as the Phan 
court did, that prolonged detention is unconstitutional, will lead to 
an identical result. Prolonged and possibly indefinite detention needs 
to be an option in order for the INS and the rest of the government 
to protect the nation, uphold the law, and preserve the powers 
granted to Congress by the Constitution. Only under such a regime 
can Congressional power “establish an uniform Rule of Naturaliza-
tion . . . throughout the United States.”204  
Daniel R. Dinger 
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